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I. INTRODUCTION
"We have learned and must not forget, that from now on, air transport 
is an essential of air power, in fact, of all national power.General 
Arnold formulated this doctrine and related it to Secretary Stimson in 
February 1945. USAF basic doctrine fosters this principle in stating that 
our strategic and tactical military airlift can deploy our forces to any
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part of the world and support them. Whether this can be achieved with 
existing capabilities is judgemental. Driven by fiscal realities, tactical 
airlift modernization continues to be deferred as C-130, C-123 and C-7 
airlift continue to age. In September 1979, Secretary of the Air Force, 
Dr. Mark, iterated that modernization of tactical airlift, as well as 
strategic airlift, had one of the highest Air Force priorities, second only
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to enhancement of strategic forces. General Jones, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, in the supplement to the military posture statement for 
1980 indicated the tactical airlift force will reach the end of its econ­
omic service life in the early 1980s. In addition, it was reported that 
today's tactical airlift can carry only about one-third of the U.S. Army's
... . .4division combat equipment items. General Moore, recently retired Commander­
in-Chief of the Military Airlift Command, complemented this latter notion.
He said the C-130 is being outgrown as U.S. Army ground forces modernize 
with larger and heavier firepower. He affirms the JCS contention by stress­
ing that by the 1980s the C—130 will be able to carry less than 50 percent 
of the Army's equipment and practically none of the Army's new and vital 
firepower.
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Despite the consensus on the need to modernize the tactical airlift 
force, and in sharp contrast to the priority established by the Secretary 
of the Air Force, tactical airlift appears to remain low on the scale of 
relative priorities. The Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal 
Year 1980 says the benefits of modernizing tactical airlift when weighed 
against expenditures for other programs cannot be justified.In testi­
mony before the U.S. Senate, General Allen, Chief of Staff, USAF, was 
consistent with Secretary Brown. General Allen indicated, in response 
to a query from Senator Stennis, that the USAF remains convinced tactical 
airlift must be modernized. However, he qualified that statement empha­
sizing that other force modernization efforts have been given a priority
7 
higher than that held by tactical airlift.
The present day inadequacy of theater airlift capability warrants a 
complete rethinking of the relative importance of airlift, vis-a-vis other 
modernization programs and a refocusing of attention on this area of 
defense needs. Set in a brief historical perspective of transportation 
dependence, this paper will attempt to focus attention on tactical airlift 
modernization, emphasizing the age of existing aircraft and the inability 
to move the large military firepower hardware of the U.S. Army.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There are some historical parallels and precedents to be recognized 
in the last several centuries of military campaigns. Noteworthy are 
those that highlight dependence upon adequate transportation to achieve 
military objectives. Supplying the basic rudiments of war has become 
more challenging through the years. Logistics problems have often become 
the key determinant in military operations. The 100,000 man force 
Gustavus Adolphus amassed against Wallenstein in 1631-32 had to march 
almost continuously in order to feed both men and horses. Local resources 
were quickly exhausted; hence, armies had to find new food and forage. 
Almost continuous movement magnified transportation needs. All too often 
the direction of march was dictated by the availability of supplies and 
transportation. Even the 17th century magazine supply system of the 
Frenchmen Le Tellier and Louvois placed demands on transportation, as did 
the follow-on concept of supplying armies from fixed bases to the rear. 
The important point to be made here is regardless of the supply system 
used in war, dependence on transportation, to varying degrees, dictated 
the relative success or failure of military operations. For example, in 
1757, Frederick II had to halt the siege of Olmutz because a convoy of 
3,000 vehicles was interdicted. In this case, he had the transportation 
but failed to afford it sufficient protection. To prevent similar occur­
rences Frederick II allotted 8,000, 15,000 and 30,000 men to protect
8important convoys later in the same year.
Realizing the predeliction for siege warfare during the 18th century, 
Napoleon avoided sieges and their dependence on logistics. In his campaign 
of 1805 Napoleon is credited with establishing a unique standard of organ­
ization and administration of the logistic needs of the "Grande Armee." 
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Despite a notable shortage of transportation, Napoleon established a line 
of communications from Strasbourg, France to Augsburg, Germany using 
sixty four-horse wagons within each of seventeen sections of the route. 
This shuttling concept provided clothing and ammunition in an unprecedented 
system of supply and transportation. Napoleon also established an ammu­
nition depot at Heilbronn and later a subsistence depot at Braunau, the 
forerunners of today's depot concepts. The stationary nature of these 
depots may be one of the evolutionary steps in the ultimate reliance of 
modern armies on an umbilical cord of supply, a system that is transporta­
tion dependent. It is interesting to note that in support of this depot 
concept, three of Napoleon's operational corps commanders, Soult, Ney 
and Bernadotte, were ordered to relinquish control of gravely needed 
transport to sustain the operation of a supply distribution system. In 
addition, so critical were these transportation assets and supplies that 
no less than three divisions were detailed to protect the lines of communi­
cation. Napoleon was, of course, successful in his march to Austerlitz,
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in contrast to his later campaign in Russia.
The geographical route and many of the failures of Napoleon's venture 
into Russia in 1812 are replicated by the German invasion of Russia in 
1941. In both cases transportation dependence had an adverse impact on 
military operations. The inability to transport forward sufficient supplies 
prevented sustained operations and severely disrupted the scheduled time­
tables. Whereas Napoleon's 600,000 man army advanced from East Prussia, 
passed Minsk and Smolensk enroute to Moscow, Hitler used 144 German 
divisions (over five times the size of Napoleon's army) with the Army 
Group Center following the same Napoleonic route. Napoleon's army used 
horse drawn supply trains and despite the passage of over a century, the 
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German army also used horse drawn wagons in conjunction with railroads 
and motorized trucks. As a case in point, during the Russia campaign of 
WWII, the Wehrmacht resorted to the use of "panje" (a type of peasant 
cart) to move critical supplies when truck and rail transport failed.
Weather, bad roads (the ineffectiveness of the railroad in Hitler's 
case) and the resulting inability to move critical supplies forward to 
consumption points all contributed in the failure to achieve planned 
military objectives. During the Russian campaign, the mechanized Wehrmacht 
Panzer units consistently outran their supplies. In many instances roads 
were congested by infantry troops, roads were impassable because of mud, 
and trucks were ineffective during the freezing temperatures of winter. 
Railroads in Russia offered marginal relief. The Russian railroads had 
different gauge tracks than German railroads; Russian locomotives were 
larger than German locomotives. German locomotives could not complete 
the distance between water and refueling points on Russian tracks after 
the latter were converted to German gauge. Horse drawn wagons, trucks 
and railroads repeatedly failed to produce the essential tonnages required 
at the front lines. Hitler used airlift for transportation to avert 
shortages of fuel and ammunition at the front. Theater airlift, realizing 
its genesis during World War II, often was the only timely means of trans­
porting the critical supplies, hurdling the congested road and rail net­
works. For both Napoleon's Grande Armee and Hitler's Wehrmacht logistics, 
and in particular the ubiquitous paucity of transportation, were critical 
elements in the outcome of the Russian adventures.10
The onset of World War II revealed the U.S. at a nadir in military 
preparedness. The subsequent meteoric development of military prowess 
in the Army Air Forces (AAF) is well documented. Air transportation 
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experienced dramatic improvements during World War II. On 20 June 1942, 
the Air Transport Command, absorbing missions of the Air Service Command 
and the Ferry Command, was established by direction of General Hap Arnold. 
The Ferry Command, established a year earlier (20 May 1941), had been 
responsible for ferrying aircraft destined for British use (purchased and 
Lend Lease) from American factories to Canada, to U.S. ports of embarkation 
and to African airfields. The Air Service Command had been engaged in 
domestic transport activities previously.11 In 1941, the concept of air 
logistics had not been grasped fully as a principal means of supplying 
forces in the field. As cargo backlogs mounted in the late spring and 
summer of 1942, it became evident there would be a continuing demand for 
air transport cargo space and the rapid movement of critical supplies and 
personnel shaped the concept of air transportation as an instrument of
12
logistics. From January 1942 to August 1945 the AAF shipped 19 million 
measurement tons overseas by sea, more than a third going to Europe.
Between January 1943 and August 1945 the AAF shipped over 45,000 tons 
overseas by airlift.13
"The importance of the transport plane to the operations of the AAF... 
is illustrated by the growing inventory of planes. In July 1939 the AAF 
had only 118 transports, and on the eve of Pearl Harbor it had only 216. 
Thereafter, the inventory rose steadily; by August 1944 the AAF had more
14
than 10,000 transports on hand." The continuing demand for increased 
airlift capability was evidenced by the number of transport aircraft 
accepted by the AAF in World War II. Over 10,000 C-47 transport aircraft 
were received between 1940 and 1945. The C-46 aircraft deliveries reached 
3,144 by August 1945, the C-54 aircraft inventory ultimately exceeded 
1,000 and the AAF accepted 1,771 C-45s before the war ended. The essentiality 
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of airlift was evidenced by the conversion of and the use of bombers in 
an airlift role. The B-24 bomber was modified as a transport aircraft 
and redesignated as a C-87. The B-24, designated as a C-109, was also 
modified as a tanker transport aircraft to haul large quantities of fuel 
"over the hump" from India to China. The "hump" airlift was one of the 
hallmark achievements of theater airlift during the World War II era.15 
In contrast, had Rommel had the same type of air logistics support from 
Tripoli to the Egyptian frontier, the outcome of the North African campaign 
might have been altered considerably. In many cases, Rommel had an adequate 
amount of supplies delivered to North African seaports, but he experienced 
considerable difficulty in transporting these supplies on over extended
16
vulnerable lines of communication.
In September 1944, in one notable event highlighting transportation 
dependence, B-24 operational bombers were diverted from their primary 
mission and used as transport aircraft to carry vital supplies in the 
European theater. One wing of Eighth Air Force B-24 bombers were used 
for intratheater airlift in support of General Patton's Third Army in 
France. In thirteen days of operation (September 18-30, 1944) 1,601 sorties 
(not only B-24s) carried 2,589,065 gallons of gasoline from the United
17Kingdom forward to airfields on the Continent. Projected into the 1980s, 
this would be the equivalent of B-52 bombers flying 50 gallon drums of 
diesel fuel for European 7th Army forces, albeit for the same reason - 
inadequate theater airlift capability or unresponsive surface capability 
to satisfy emergency demands. Airlift continued to serve an important 
role as the Third Army advanced into Austria and Czechoslovakia. From 
March 30 to May 8, 1945 airlift was responsible for the movement of 22 
percent (22,500 tons or six million gallons) of all gasoline going to the
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Third Army. In addition, 11 percent of the rations received by the Third
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Army during this time period arrived by airlift. As evidenced by the 
successes and failures of the "Hump" operation, Rommel in North Africa 
and Patton's surge through France and Germany, dependence upon adequate 
logistics, specifically air transportation, is a key ingredient of military 
operations.
The role of airlift started in WWII expanded during the Vietnam War. 
Between 1962 and 1973 the USAF delivered over 7 million tons of passengers 
and cargo within South Vietnam. By comparison, U.S. and British airlift
19carried about two million tons during the Berlin Airlift. At the height 
of Vietnam operations approximately ten million tons of cargo was moved 
by a combination of military and commercial motor transport (December 1967- 
December 1968). During this same period a combination of Common Service 
Airlift System C-130, C-123 and C-7 aircraft, plus U.S. Army and U.S. Marine 
Corps helicopters airlifted over two million tons of cargo within Vietnam. 
Continuing the same theme, during the January-July 1969 time period, five 
million tons were transported on the highways and over one million tons 
were airlifted, reinforcing the same 5 to 1 ratio of surface movement to 
air movement.
On numerous occasions airlift made notable contributions to military 
operations. In 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division required a major airlift 
effort to sustain operations of their assault helicopters against strong 
NVA forces at the Ploi Mo Camp south of Pleiku. Over a 29 day period 
tactical airlift delivered 186 tons per day; most of it was POL. In 
another example, Khe Sanh was resupplied by air during the first four 
months of 1968. This enabled 6,000 allied defenders to survive under 
heavy NVA pressure until reopening a land line of communication. Between
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21 January and 8 April, 12,400 tons were delivered to Khe Sanh by C-130,
21 
C-123 and C-7. Supply levels never failed to sustain the allied force.
Two U.S. Army histories summarize the essentiality of transportation.
The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953 says:
"Probably the most common limiting factor in U.S. 
Army logistics has been transportation. Whenever short­
ages of supplies or equipment have appeared at the battle 
fronts, from the Revolutionary War to the Korean War, 
more often than not it has been the result of some 
shortage in transportation somewhere along the line."
"Generally most transportation difficulties for
U.S. Army forces...have been found within the theaters of 
operations.. .
The U.S. Army Vietnam Studies, Logistics Support states:
"An adequate intra-theater airlift capability must 
be planned for. Plans for air transporting 10 percent of 
the anticipated cargo and 65 percent of the total monthly 
forces should provide an adequate initial capability."24
The implication is clear. The need for transportation, and specif­
ically airlift, as captured by military history serves as a herald to
those who would recognize its relevance. As George Santayana said,
those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
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III. AIRCRAFT AGE
Accepting the premises that, historically, transportation has con­
tributed to the success of military operations and air transportation is 
playing an increasingly more dramatic role, then, next, one must address 
the question, why modernize tactical airlift now? There are many reasons, 
but the two most often discussed reasons for modernizing tactical airlift 
forces are the advanced age of existing C-130, C-123 and C-7 aircraft and
the inability of the C-130 to carry large, bulky, outsize equipment of
25
the U.S. Army division force. There is merit in both of these arguments; 
a brief summary follows.
The Military Airlift Command (MAC)
(ROC) 9-75 indicates that by 1985 C-130
years old. Compounding this problem is
Required Operational Capability 
technology will be more than 35 
the accelerated aging caused by






Active USAF 381 - 12/6
Air National Guard 179 - 19/8
Air Force Reserve 148 - 19/0
C-123 C-7
No. of Age No. of Age
Aircraft - yrs./mos. Aircraft - yrs./mos
17 14/4
63 - 23/6 32 14/0
27 
*A11 age figures reflect a January 1980 status.
The above table reflects the advanced age of the total USAF tactical
airlift inventory. By comparison, the average age of F-4 fighter aircraft,
another Air Force mainstay, is: Active USAF - 11 years and 4 months, 
-11-
ANG - 14 years and 4 months, and AFR - 15 years and 2 months. The Active 
Force C-130 is one year and 2 months older, the ANG is 5 years and 4 months 
older and the AFR is 3 years and 10 months older. In a program to be 
applauded, the F-4 aircraft is being replaced by new fighter aircraft.
To carry the age argument one step further, the C-123 aircraft, one 
of our primary short take off and landing (STOL) aircraft, is almost 24 
years old. The C-123 ranks number three as the oldest USAF aircraft in 
the Air Reserve Forces behind the B-57 (25 years, 2 months) and the C-131 
(24 years, 5 months). Maintaining the 63 C-123 aircraft is extremely 
difficult. The age of the relatively few aircraft increases the cost of 
individual aircraft spare parts. The same problem of uniqueness exists 
for the 49 C-7 aircraft, though they are not quite as old. A USAF com­
parative cost effectiveness analysis of alternative tactical airlift 
aircraft concluded that a 6% to 9% savings could be realized by retiring 
the C-7, C-123 and older C-130 aircraft from the Air Reserve Forces and 
replacing them with the newer C-130 aircraft from the Active USAF. The 
Active USAF C-130 aircraft should be replaced by advanced medium STOL
28
aircraft (AMST).
The Posture of Military Airlift Report of the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC No. 94-40) cites a June 1970 report that points out the 
programmed tactical airlift force for 1974 is not encouraging. In fact, 
the tactical airlift situation was then projected to be comparable to 
the "deplorable" strategic airlift force of 1960. Witnesses testified 
C-7, C-123 and C-130 replacements were required, as was an airlift aircraft 
with STOL capability. Moreover, the report cites AF Secretary Brown's 
testimony in 1966 admitting a possible need for a STOL aircraft to fill 
the gap existing between the capabilities of the C-130 and helicopters.
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The 1966, 1970 and 1976 subcommittee reports recognized the age of the 
tactical airlift force and supported the AF modernization program. In 
addition, the subcommittee report acknowledges engineer age acceleration 
estimates for aircraft operated in Southeast Asia. These aircraft exper­
ienced fatigue rates ten times higher than anticipated when designed, 
contributing to the age problem. Although the AF has procured over 100 
new C-130 aircraft since the 1970 subcommittee report, the posture of
29 
tactical airlift STOL capability has not improved in ten years.
The Congress has expressed recent concern over the Air Force tactical 
airlift modernization program. In his report to the Congress on DOD 
Authorizations for FY 1980, the Honorable Mr. Price, HASC, recommended an 
authorization of $79,690 million to continue the C-130 procurement program 
so that older, obsolete C-130A aircraft could be phased out. The USAF 
aircraft procurement request for FY 80 had not contained a request for 
C-130 aircraft.3° in a subsequent action, a joint House/Senate conference 
approved the C-130H procurement funding level. Thus the Air Force is 
procuring eight new unrequested C-130s.
Lest we forget, both Napoleon and Hitler, despite over one century 
of time, used horse drawn wagons in supporting their quests in Russia. 
Hitler had limited success resupplying Panzer units with airlift. Tactical 
airlift in greater quantities might have added a new dimension to Wehrmacht 
tactics. Dependency on transportation, then as well as now, must be a
prime concern in planning future operations.
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IV. U.S. ARMY EQUIPMENT
Central to discussions on modernizing tactical airlift is the require­
ment for the U.S. Air Force to be able to airlift complete U.S. Army units, 
including equipment, within an overseas theater. Supporting arguments 
are scenario dependent. It is reasonable to postulate a situation that 
will require the rapid movement of U.S. Army units from one flank of 
Europe to another or forward from a reserve position in the rear. Consider 
strategic reserve divisions located in Belgium and required in Turkey. 
Also consider the deployment of prepositioned European equipment, such as 
tanks and artillery, to the Persian Gulf simultaneously with the deploy­
ment of forces located in the continental U.S. These require a theater 
aircraft capable of moving outsize cargo for a response to be successful 
without withdrawing resources from the strategic airlift role.
Modern command and control capabilities have broadened a commander's 
ability to observe, react and influence the battle. Quantum improvements 
in battlefield surveillance have increased the potential for commanders 
to receive early indicators of threats and/or opportunities for offensive 
battlefield movements. Responding to threats and opportunities is contin­
gent on the adequacy and flexibility of transportation systems. The value 
of the improved detection systems is lost without the ability to react 
and seize the opportunity.
One dissenting argument from opponents of the AMST is the lack of an 
historical precedent for unit moves via airlift. The counter argument 
suggests the airlift capability must exist before the concept can be 
exercised.
Accepting the above preconditions of scenario dependency, the argument
to modernize tactical airlift because of the changing nature of U.S. Army 
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unit equipment is equally cogent. In the 1950s, the U.S. Army was pri­
marily infantry oriented and battlefield mobility was not their long suit. 
In 1954, for instance, about when the C-130 aircraft was being designed, 
the U.S. Army consisted of two airborne, 13 infantry and only three
31
armored divisions. By comparison, the U.S. Army for 1985 is programmed 
to have 11 or 12 heavy armored or mechanized divisions and 4 or 5 light 
airborne, airmobile and infantry divisions. This, of course, assumes 
the U.S. Army achieves program objectives.
Since the U.S. Army has been undergoing extensive equipment modern­
ization to achieve greater firepower potential and battlefield mobility, 
the USAF undertook a study, as yet unpublished, that measures the USAF 
capability to airlift typical Army units now (1978) and in the future
32(1986). The study dramatizes the increased size and weight of Army 
units projected to exist in 1986.
The study reports some 99 equipment modernization programs that will 
alter the cargo profile of units deploying via airlift. For instance, the 
M551 Sheridan tank is being phased out of the inventory. Where a replace­
ment is required the M60 and XM-1 tanks will be used, thereby replacing 
oversize equipment that could be airlifted on a C-130 with a tank that can 
only be airlifted by a C-5 aircraft or a modern tactical airlift aircraft 
with outsize airlift capability. The list continues. The Army plans to 
replace the M60A1 tank with heavier M60A3 and XM-1 tanks. The C-130 can­
not airlift any of these pieces of equipment. The number of 155mm self- 
propelled howitzers in heavy divisions will be increased from 54 to 72, 
thereby raising the total weight of the divisions and increasing the 
amount of cargo that cannot deploy via C-130. Replacing the M113 Armored 
Personnel Carriers with the Infantry Fighting Vehicles will increase the 
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amount of cargo outsize to C-130 capability and, finally, replacing the 
Vulcan Air Defense Gun with Division Air Defense (DIVAD) Guns adds greater 
quantities of outsize equipment. These are but a few examples of the 
impact of the U.S. Army equipment modernization programs that must be
33 considered in selecting a follow-on aircraft to replace the C-130.
The changing shape of the Army's equipment can be dramatized another 
way. A simple comparison of total weight by unit type demonstrates clearly 








Armored Cavalry Regiment 12,950 19,691
Air Assault Divison 17,040 20,107
Airborne Division 16,731 20,438
Infantry Division 30,392 37,521
Mechanized Division 51,167 63,768
Armored Division 57,393 70,807
* S/T = Short Ton or 2000 lbs.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated below, too much of the added weight 
of these units is in items of equipment that will not fit on existing 
tactical airlift aircraft. Table III shows the amounts of unit equipment 
by weight that cannot fit on C-130 and AMST aircraft presently (1978) 
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In sum, the worst fears of our military leadership are well founded. 
The USAF study makes it clear that our present tactical airlift force of 
C-7, C-123 and C-130s cannot airlift 42% of the unit equipment of a U.S. 
Army armored cavalry regiment (ACR) now and will be unable to airlift 
almost 75% of an ACR's equipment in 1986. For mechanized and armored 
divisions, that could comprise three-fourths of our active U.S. Army 
divisions in 1986, the C-130 will be unable to carry almost 57% and 61% 
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of division equipment respectively. One additional point is very impor­
tant. The tanks, armored vehicles and artillery that cannot be airlifted 
are the very items that will be most decisive in altering the outcome of 
a battle.
Figure 1 shows the door openings and relative sizes of airlift air­
craft. Graphically portrayed, it is apparent that large, bulky, outsize 
equipment that fit on the C-5 aircraft will not fit on the C-130. This 
graphic dramatically demonstrates the uniqueness of the C-5 as the only 
aircraft capable of moving the U.S. Army. This uniqueness could set up 
the counterproductive, competitive demands for using the C-5 (and later 
the C-X) in strategic and tactical roles if an outsize cargo capable 
theater airlift aircraft does not exist. In fact, an argument can be made 
not to build a new tactical airlift aircraft that will fulfill military 
needs beyond the turn of the century unless it can accommodate all of the 
equipment deployable on the C-5 and the new C-X aircraft.
One can only speculate on the scenarios of the next war and whether 
tactical airlift will be the mover of large pieces of military firepower 
or boxes of supplies. Yet we could predetermine the future by ignoring 
the theater outsize airlift need. Having only oversize tactical airlift 
capability available will ensure that the options of moving complete U.S.
Army units by theater airlift will not be available.
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Figure 1: End Loading Aircraft Cargo Door Dimensions
114
228
All dimensions are in inches. --------------- C-5
---------- ----- AMST
---------------- C-130 (C-141)
Source: USAF Saber Size-Army Study and AF Reg 76-2
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V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
There is ample empirical evidence documenting the historic dependence 
upon transportation for successful military operations. Recognition of 
this dependence is an essential first step. Next one should acknowledge 
the less than satisfactory status of our tactical airlift posture. Air­
craft age is a factor; the U.S. Army equipment modernization program is 
an equally important consideration. There are other arguments for modern­
izing tactical airlift. Hundreds more airfields in Western Europe are 
accessible to a STOL aircraft, and tactical airlift with air refueling 
capability can augment strategic airlift. Viewed from any angle, a 
tactical airlift modernization program should be re-energized and its 
importance should not be overlooked.
Despite a consensus on the need to modernize tactical airlift and 
despite the strong supportive arguments, low relative priorities in the 
budgetary world of competing demands and limited resources often terminate 
important programs. The recent Presidential decision to create a rapid 
deployment force and build the C-X may again preempt tactical airlift 
modernization or may overshadow theater airlift needs if the C-X is in­
tended as both a strategic and tactical aircraft.
The new C-X aircraft should be as big as, or bigger than, the existing 
C-5 aircraft, with similar outsize cargo carrying capacity. This is 
imperative if we are to protect our vital interests in the Persian Gulf 
region. As Secretary Brown said recently, "The other major initiative 
entails development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft 
able to carry Army equipment, including tanks, over intercontinental dis­
tances." A large, outsize capable C-X aircraft will also contribute to 
the NATO rapid reinforcement concept. The ability to carry several tanks 
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to distant locations is a logistical imperative. However, the large size 
of the C-X could restrict its application as a tactical aircraft which 
has been indicated as a secondary role of the C-X. Secretary Brown said 
the new C-X aircraft after an initial deployment phase will assist in
36 
intratheater movements. He also said the new C-X will be optimized for
37 
the intertheater, not intratheater missions. The secondary intratheater 
role of the C-X appears to be at cross purposes with the primary role.
The best tactical airlift aircraft should be designed to enable the 
aircraft to enter and exit remote, unsophisticated airfields, probably 
with STOL characteristics. The previously mentioned MAC ROC 9-75 required 
a 28,000 lbs. payload capability. The new C-X in the strategic role 
should have a 200,000 lbs. payload like the C-5. Altering the size of 
the tactical C-X in making it larger to adapt it to strategic roles or 
making the strategic C-X smaller for tactical roles compromises the pro­
ductivity of the C-X in both roles. In other words, the new aircraft 
will not be best suited to either role and could perform only marginally 
in both.
A second nontrivial consideration will be the competing demands for 
the application of the new C-X in one role or the other. Since a surplus 
of airlift capability will not exist in the early months of a NATO conflict, 
competing demands for the C-X will emanate from both the strategic and 
tactical arenas. If applied in one role, it will not alleviate the short­
fall of airlift in the other role. During the first days of a European 
conflict, demands for airlift within the theater will be considerable. 
Noncombatants will require transportation to "safe havens" for onward 
transportation to the U.S. Malpositioned units will require relocation 
and war reserve stocks must be distributed. Aeromedical evacuation from 
-21-
battle areas to rearward staging areas will also be needed. Deciding 
whether to apply the C-X to these missions or to the strategic airlift 
mission will be perplexing.
When considering the global and theater demands for airlift, the 
weight of evidence indicates that two aircraft are required. There is 
considerable merit in the argument to enhance strategic airlift capability, 
and the C-X will be a welcome addition to that mission. There is also 
merit in modernizing tactical airlift. The two programs should not nec­
essarily compete; in fact, they should be complementary. The U.S. inter­
continental power projection capability will improve dramatically with the 
C-141, C-5 and a new large C-X. The newer C-130s and a modern tactical 
airlift aircraft with outsize cargo and STOL capability would provide the 
best array of airlift aircraft for the European or the Persian Gulf 
theaters. World War II started with only 118 transport aircraft in the 
military inventory. WWII ended with over 10,000. Recognizing our depend­
ency on air transportation for successful military operations, two new 
military airlift aircraft will be better than one.
-22-
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